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Abstract. This paper presents a computational model of visual attention 
incorporating a cognitive imperfection known as inattentional blindness. We 
begin by presenting four factors that determine successful attention allocation: 
conspicuity, mental workload, expectation and capacity. We then propose a 
framework to study the effects of those factors on an unexpected object and 
conduct an experiment to measure the corresponding subjective awareness level. 
Finally, we discuss the application of a visual attention model for 
conversational agents. 
1   Introduction 
If an embodied (virtual) agent is expected to interact with humans in a shared real or 
virtual environment, it must have the cognitive ability to understand human visual 
attention and its limitations. Likewise, an embodied agent should possess human 
attention attributes so that its eyes and resultant body movements convey appropriate 
and humanly understandable behaviors.  Suppressed or inappropriate eye movements 
can by themselves damage the communicative effectiveness of an embodied agent. 
Thus, in order to build convincing computational models of human behavior, one 
should have a thorough understanding of communication and interaction patterns of 
real people.   Attention models may be the key to leading animated agents out of the 
“uncanny valley” where increasing visual accuracy, combined with lifeless eyes, 
results in a “ghoulish” appearance when animated. 
As a first step to making the appearance of virtual agents more realistic, we are 
creating a model of human visual attention. The visual attention system has been 
proposed to employ two filters − bottom-up [10] [18] and top-down [9][4] − to limit 
visual processing to the most important information of the world. In our early work [7], 
we suggested a computational model that was unique because not only did it integrate 
both of these filters, but also combined 2D snapshots of the scene with 3D structural 
information. However, after extensive examination of the Psychology literature, we 
became aware of the many intricate shortcomings of human cognition, and recognized 
the importance of incorporating inadequacies in processing as a means of making a 
simulated human agent more realistic.  
Inattentional blindness [21], as the name implies, occurs when objects that are 
physically capable of being seen in fact go unnoticed. Inattentional blindness was 
chosen as the primary phenomenon to include in our framework for two reasons. First, 
evidence suggests that it mainly involves the attention system, rather than other 
cognitive structures such as memory or language [1]. Other prominent attentional 
deficits, such as change blindness, appear to be tied much closer to these additional 
cognitive structures [17]. Second, inattentional blindness is a robust feature of multi-
modal attention and analogous paradigms, such as the “cocktail party effect”, have 
been well documented in auditory attention [19]. Therefore, once this model is 
complete its future applications will not be restricted to the visual system, but can be 
extended into other realms of cognitive processing. 
While it is commonly believed that an object requires only perceptible physical 
properties to be noticed in a scene, recent studies have found that people often miss 
very visible objects when they are preoccupied with an attentionally demanding task 
[20]. Mack and Rock coined the term inattentional blindness, and concluded that 
conscious perception is not possible without attention [12]. Green [6] attempted to 
classify all of the prominent features of the phenomenon, and suggested that there are 
four categories that these features fall into: conspicuity, mental workload, expectation 
and capacity. Through experimental testing, Most et al. [13] forged a link between 
attention capture and inattentional blindness, and revealed the single most important 
factor affecting the phenomenon, the attentional set. They also introduced the concept 
of different levels of attentional processing, which, in our work, is categorized as four 
stages of subject awareness [22]: unnoticed, subliminal, non-reflective and semantic. 
In order to formulate a realistic attentional framework, we will examine attentional 
deficiency and inattentional blindness, while attempting to answer three questions:  
1. What kinds of stimulus properties will influence the likelihood of missing the 
unexpected object or event? 
2. What kinds of perceiver-controlled mechanisms decide what should be permitted 
into consciousness and what should be rejected?  
3. How much, if any, of a scene do we perceive when we are not attending to it?  
Theories and Experiment 
First we define the four factors critical to inattentional blindness and describe how 
they are used in our experiment to study their effects on subjective awareness level. 
By questioning subjects who participated in our experiment, we hoped to determine 
quantitative descriptions of each parameter’s individual and combined importance in 
attention allocation.   
The Four Factors Model 
Because cognitive resources are limited, attention acts as a filter to quickly examine 
sensory input and allow only a small subset of it through for complete processing. The 
rest of the input never reaches consciousness, so is left unnoticed and unremembered.  
It has been suggested that the attentional filter is affected by four factors [6]: 
conspicuity, mental workload, expectation and capacity.  
Conspicuity 
Conspicuity refers to an object’s ability to grab attention, and can be divided into two 
distinct groups: sensory and cognitive conspicuity [20].  Sensory conspicuity refers to 
the physical or bottom-up properties of an object, such as contrast, size, location and 
movement. Cognitive conspicuity, on the other hand, reflects the personal and social 
relevance that an object contains. Face pop-out − the phenomenon where faces that are 
meaningful to a person are more likely to capture attention − is an example of 
cognitive conspicuity in visual attention capture. 
Mental Workload 
There is only a finite amount of attention available to be rationed to objects and events. 
Thus, items that require more attention decrease one’s ability to allocate this limited 
resource to other objects. As tasks become more difficult they increase the mental 
workload of the subject and require more attention, increasing the likelihood that an 
unexpected event will go unnoticed. Similarly, as tasks become less difficult, they 
require less attention. An object requiring less mental processing with time is said to 
be habituated [6]. This will cause workload to decrease and allow for other objects in 
the scene to be attended to more readily. An example of habituation is learning to 
drive a car. While driving may begin as a very difficult task, as it becomes more 
ingrained in one’s repertoire of abilities, it becomes less mentally taxing. 
Expectation 
While the habituation process slowly decreases workload levels for the entire scene 
with time, expectation quickly causes specific stimuli to gain more weight over time 
and trials. According to the Contingent-Capture Hypothesis [20], as items and 
properties of items become more expected they become part of an attentional set. This 
attentional set then informs a person what is important and relevant in a scene.  
Inattentional blindness occurs when certain items are expected so much that people 
ignore any others. The Contingent-Capture Hypothesis, and the attentional set’s 
involvement in inattentional blindness, will be described in detail in the next section. 
Capacity 
Attentional capacity refers to the number of items and information that a person can 
attend to at a time. Variations in capacity are a result of the individual differences 
between people, but are also affected by a person’s current mental state (fatigue), 
cognitive processes (habituation), and physiological state (drugs and alcohol) [6].  
Our experiment and its parameters 
 Our study was based on a famous demonstration of inattentional blindness, 
“Gorillas in our midst” [16], which asked participants to count the number of times a 
basketball was passed among a group of people. During this activity, a individual in a 
gorilla costume walked into and through the scene.  Rather remarkably, many subjects 
do not recall seeing anything unusual!  In our variation (Fig. 1), subjects were 
assigned the task of counting the number of ball passes between images of human-like 
characters that we created in a virtual environment.  During this time, an unexpected 
image passed through the scene and the event continued, undisturbed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 Example Frame of Animation Demo in the Experiment: Eight players (four in black T-
shirts, four in white) move around the screen randomly while two 'balls': (one white, one black) 
bounce between them. Subjects were responsible for counting the number of passes made to the 
black T-shirt team using the black ball.  A pass was considered to be completed when the ball 
hit the image, and the image 'jumped'   Fifty seconds into the task an unexpected, face-forward, 
gray boxed character (the unexpected object) passed through the scene, but the players 
continued as normal. The task lasted a total of 90 seconds. 
The four factors of inattentional blindness were measured by adjusting various 
parameters during the experiment. The appearance and movement of the objects 
contained in the scene, as well as the scene itself, were varied in order to affect the 
cognitive workload, sensory conspicuity and attentional set.  
The first variation, the mental workload of the subject, could be high, medium, or 
low, determined by the speed that the balls moved and the amount of background 
clutter. A subject in a high mental workload group observed very fast moving balls 
and a cluttered (green and white checkered) background; the medium mental workload 
group saw medium speed moving balls and a cluttered background; the low mental 
workload group watched a slow moving ball and an uncluttered (all gray) background. 
The sensory conspicuity of the unexpected object could also be varied: high, 
medium, or low, determined by the inherent physical salience of the unexpected object. 
Here, the saliency was dependent on the speed, as well as the trajectory that the 
unexpected object took.  High sensory conspicuity groups were presented with an 
unexpected image that appeared and disappeared while moving quickly along the 
background of the scene. The unexpected object of the medium sensory conspicuity 
group moved at a medium speed, in an irregular manner (beginning in the background, 
moving back-and-forth towards the foreground) across the screen. The low sensory 
conspicuity group received an unexpected object that moved at a slow speed in a 
straight line across the background of the scene.  
Finally, the attentional set held by our subjects always contained the color black 
because they were attending to the black T-shirt group and tracking a black ball. What 
varied in the attentional set parameter is how similar the unexpected object's features 
were to the attentional set held by the subject, so the values were: matched, neither 
matched nor unmatched, or unmatched, according to the color of the unexpected 
object's T-shirt (black, maroon or white respectively). In Table 1, we list the variables 
in the experiment and their corresponding factors. 
Table 1: Summary of the relationship between the four factors and the experimental parameters. 
It shows how the four factors interact with shown the attentional set and object properties 
Factors  Definition Parameters 
Sensory  
 
Pop-out due to an object’s inherent 
physical saliency in a scene. 
Color & Intensity 
Contrast 
Opaqueness 
Environment 
Clutter 
Illumination  
Size 
Movement  
Velocity  
Trajectory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conspicuity 
Cognitive  
Pop-out due to the perceiver’s mental 
state and task relevance.  
Personal Relevance 
 Meaningful     
Face Pop-Out  
 Familiarity 
Workload  
The amount of attention that the 
current item requires.  Reduces 
probability of attention shift. 
Difficulty 
Environment 
Habituation 
 Time 
 Trial 
Expectation The amount of attention an object 
receives varies according to a 
perceiver’s beliefs about its relevance 
in the scene, due to past experience. 
Attentional Set 
 Task-specific 
features 
 
Capacity The total amount of attention 
available varies by individual 
Individual 
differences 
Mental State 
Computational Framework 
 Green’s four-factor model specifies a theoretical set of parameters involved in 
inattentional blindness, while Most et al. provide the evidence for a detailed 
progression from “ignored” to “part of consciousness.” Our model integrates the two 
theories − attempting to retain the individual contribution of each − into a 
comprehensive theory of attention allocation (Fig. 2). 
Dynamic internal representation of the world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Block Diagram for computational framework. It illustrates the computational model of 
visual attention incorporating the four factors model and the contingent capture hypothesis. 
Our attention capture framework relies on the cooperation of an internally-driven top-
down setting and external bottom-up input. The bottom-up setting uses the “saliency” 
(sensory conspicuity features) of objects in the scene to filter perceptual information 
and compute an objective saliency map. Primary visual features such as color, contrast 
and motion are the features examined by this filter.  Simultaneously, top-down settings, 
such as expectation and face pop-out determine the set of items that are contextually 
important, such as the attentional set, which is a subjective feature pool of task-
prominent properties maintained in memory. At any moment, focused attention only 
provides a spatio-temporal coherence map for one object [15].  This coherence map 
highlights the object that has been calculated to be the most important at that moment 
in the scene, and can thus be used to drive the gaze of an embodied agent. 
The final coherency map is created in three steps.  First, a spatial coherency map is 
created, then it is augmented by temporal coherency and finally moderated by the 
attentional set. The spatial coherency map is computed by transforming a snapshot of 
the scene to the retinal field by a retinal filter. It is generally believed that the internal 
mental image is built through non-uniform coding of the scene image. This coding is 
determined by the anatomical structure of the human retina, causing the image to 
appear very clear wherever the center of the retina is located, and increasingly blurry 
as distance from the center increases. In other words, whatever a person looks directly 
at will appear the most clear in their mental image, and objects will appear less clear 
the further they are from the in-focus object.  Log-polar sampling [2] is employed as 
an approximation to the foveated representation of the visual system. The processing 
occurs rapidly (i.e., within a few hundred milliseconds) and in parallel across a 2D 
snapshot image of the scene. To allow real-time computation, interpolation between 
the partitions of receptive fields is implemented [8]. For each trial of our experiment, 
the size of the fixation field (the patch with the highest resolution) remained 
approximately constant since the distance from the subject to the screen, as well as the 
resolution of the animated demo, were fixed. 
Once the spatial map is created, a temporal mapping highlights the direction of 
important movement. A final coherency map is generated by integrating these two 
maps and filtering the objects of interest using the attentional set. 
The Contingent-Capture Hypothesis and the Attentional set 
The attentional set, determined by subjective expectation, will further tune the 
generated spatio-temporal coherency map. The Contingent-Capture Hypothesis states 
that the only time that an object receives attention is when it, or properties of it, is 
contained in the attentional set held by the subject [5]. Most et al. expand on this 
theory, revealing that before an object can even be considered for attention, and thus 
compared to the attentional set, a transient orienting response to the object must occur. 
Consequently, the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object increases with the 
object’s similarity to the currently attended object. In our animation demo, since the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              (a)                                                                (b) 
Fig. 3 Generation of Coherency Map. (a): Three influences of attention capture: spatial, 
temporal and attentional set. (b): The final coherency map, resulting from the combined effect 
of the three influences. 
task was to count the number of times that the black ball hit the black T-shirt players, 
attentional set={black T-shirt people, black ball} would be warranted by the 
Temporal  
Coherency 
Attentional 
Set Matching 
Final coherency map Spatial  
Coherency 
Contingent-Capture Hypothesis. Fig. 3(a), demonstrates the three influences on the 
final coherency map. The red circle represents the spatial coherency map, the green 
circle denotes the temporal coherency, and the blue square reveals the object that 
matches the black color as well as the black T-shirt people held as a property of the 
attentional set.  The red ellipse in Fig. 3(b) illustrates the readjusted coherency map 
that incorporates all three influences.   
 
Subjective Awareness Level 
Following completion of the task, participants filled out a questionnaire to determine if 
they noticed an unexpected object. To discover the level of processing that the object 
received, questions probed how well they perceived the object. Questions began by 
vaguely asking about anything unusual, and increased in specificity until subjects were 
asked to choose the unexpected image out of a line-up of eight.  
We now introduce the concept of awareness level to describe the degrees of 
perceptual organization achieved by the visual system. At the lowest extreme is 
complete inattentional blindness − attentional resources failed to be allocated to the 
object resulting in a failure to notice it. At the opposite end is the highest level of 
consciousness, the semantic level, where the object is perceived as a figure-ground 
discrimination with meaning. In between the two extremes are the subliminal level and 
the non-reflective level. The subliminal level is represented by a subject’s 
acknowledgement of the presence of the unexpected object, but no conscious 
awareness of any of its physical characteristics. Hence, important subliminal messages 
were transmitted for further processing because they were salient enough to cause a 
transient orienting response, but were prevented from reaching higher levels. With a 
little more attentional investment, objects could have been processed at the non-
reflective level. At the non-reflective level the object receives enough attention to 
allow the subject to retain some, but not all, of its features in memory. At this level, 
the subject has not yet developed a figure or ground structure. Thus, a partial  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Workflow of three filters. It demonstrates how three filters work to determine different 
level of process. 
description of the object can be expected, but some details will be missed. Fig. 4 
shows a block diagram of these processing levels. 
1 2 3 4 
The amount of attention devoted to the processing of an object can also be 
explained by how several filters work. When an object is not physically salient enough 
to catch attention, it is discarded by the sensory conspicuity filter, resulting in no 
processing and, consequently, no conscious awareness of it. An object has passed the 
sensory conspicuity comparison when it was eye-catching enough to induce an 
unconscious transient shift of attention. If the properties of this object do not match 
those held in the attentional set, it falls out of current coherence map, having received 
only minimal attention. But even if the object was physically salient and held many 
properties that matched the attentional set, it can still be discarded due to the capacity 
bottleneck.  At this level, the object has been processed quite a bit, but not completely, 
so a subject’s description of the object would contain some partial or even incorrect 
details. Finally, the object approaches the semantic level and is fully processed in 
conscious perception. For people who allowed the unexpected item to be sustained in 
attention, a detailed description is not difficult.  
Experiment Results and Discussion 
Thirty-six participants were randomly assigned to one of 27 groups that varied 
according to three parameters: mental workload, sensory conspicuity and attentional 
set.  The data from six participants was discarded because of previous experience with 
inattentional blindness, or incorrect performance on the task. The results are 
summarized in Table 2 and illustrated in Fig. 5. The awareness level is assigned as a 
score from 1 to 4, corresponding to the processing levels from unnoticed to semantic, 
respectively. Each group included 10 subjects. The average score for the matched, 
unmatched, and neither matched nor unmatched attentional set groups was 2.5, 2.1 
and 3.0, respectively.  
Table. 2: Summary of the levels of processing averaged by the subjects in each group. 
   
 Thus, we can consider the results favorable since they agree with the four-factor 
model and our computational framework. This validates our model’s assumption on 
these three very important factors of inattentional blindness.  There are a few 
interesting findings to note. 
 
1.    We found the neither matched nor unmatched object is generally the most easily 
noticed one of the three attentional set groups.  While counterintuitive, this 
finding is supported by our model. The model allows for the possibility that 
objects that perfectly match the attentional set will be discarded in level one if 
they are not physically salient enough. It would be reasonable to believe that the 
black and white T-shirt unexpected images (matched and unmatched, 
Workload Conspicuity Attentional set Average 
Low Med High Low Med High 
Match (subj : 10) 2.5      2.7 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.3 3.3 
Unmatch (subj: 10) 2.1 3.3 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.0 
Neither (subj: 10) 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 1.7 3.7 3.7 
Average  3.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.8 3.0 
respectively) were not physically salient in the scene, and could have been 
discarded in level one. The maroon T-shirt unexpected object (neither matched 
nor unmatched), could have been inherently salient enough to pass through the 
first bottom-up filter and then made its way into awareness because of its 
similarity to the attentional set in pant color and body shape as well as the T-shirt 
which is darker than it is light. (That is, it was more black than white – so more 
likely to be in the attentional set than in the inhibition set).  More work should be 
done to illuminate the causal features in this situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        (a)                                               (b)                                                   (c) 
Fig. 5 For all charts, red corresponds to the neither matched nor unmatched attentional set, 
black corresponds to the matched set and blue corresponds to the unmatched set. (a) Awareness 
Score vs. Workload. The unexpected object becomes more noticeable as the workload is 
reduced for all three attentional set groups. (b) Awareness Score vs. Conspicuity. The 
unexpected object receives greater processing when sensory conspicuity increases though there 
is some noise in the unmatched group. (c) Awareness Scores vs. Attentional set.  The 
unexpected object receives the most processing when it is neither matched nor unmatched and 
the least when it is unmatched. 
2.    Additionally, there are two interesting findings about workload. Not only does it 
show the largest difference between its largest variations, suggesting that 
workload is the most important feature of attention capture and inattention 
blindness, but it also shows its largest variation between its medium and low 
settings (as opposed to the expected high and low settings). The only difference 
between the high and medium setting is the ball speed, but the ball with high 
speed was extremely fast. It is possible that the high setting was too difficult, and 
that people were more easily distracted because they had actually given up on the 
task.  The medium speed may have been just difficult enough.  This is another 
important parameter to investigate. 
Application 
The importance of a flawed attention model is considerable. Communication, 
especially face-to-face conversational interaction [3], is affected not only by the 
individuals involved, but also by what is taking place in the external environment [14]. 
To improve the naturalness of conversations, we are attempting to use the attentional 
framework to create embodied agents that are aware of a perceived world. While 
attention to the conversational partner is the most basic form of signaling 
understanding by the agent, a listener whose eyes never waver from her partner, 
despite background events, appears lifeless. 
 An agent with a realistic attentional system also has the ability to use the perceptual 
information it gains from the external world to enhance its engagement during a 
conversation. Engagement is defined here as the process by which two (or more) 
participants establish and maintain their perceived connection during interactions they 
jointly undertake [19][20]. Three types of engagement cues are categorized: those 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Snapshots of two conversational agents interacting. During the conversation, a man 
with red eyes walks through the background. In the first case (top), the red T-shirt man walks 
off and does not turn his face towards the speaker. Thus, the speaker continues to talk, paying 
no attention to the man, even though he has fallen into her line of vision. In this situation, the 
perceptual information of the man is discarded by the visual attention model of the speaker. In 
the second case (bottom), when the man turns his head and shows his red eyes, the speaker is 
shocked. The face pop-out and physical saliency of the man causes the engagement of the 
speaker to shift from the listener to the external world stimuli. 
with oneself, those with a conversational partner, and those with the environment. Our 
inattention blindness framework can improve the engagement behaviors of an 
embodied agent, particularly for the transition from self/partner to the environment. 
Therefore, in conjunction with an eye-movement model [11], the attentional model 
will increase the realism of an agent’s engagement behaviors, as demonstrated in Fig. 
6.  
Future Work and Conclusion 
As embodied agents become more commonplace elements of interpersonal 
interactions, adequate computational frameworks for cognitive processes are essential. 
Not only must the framework replicate normal human functioning, it should also 
demonstrate abnormal and imperfect human functioning, or else the agent will never 
be able to assimilate into a human-interactive environment. We have presented current 
theories of inattentional blindness and demonstrated how to integrate them into one 
model of visual attention. We attempted to justify our model with an experiment that 
examined three of the most important parameters, and discovered that the results agree 
with our proposed computational framework. 
Future work for the model will include:  further exploration of the parameters of 
habituation and capacity level, as well as more experimentally supported 
quantification. In addition, it is important to have models that can predict attention 
failure in order to decide how to compensate for, as well as reduce, human errors in 
perception in critical situations such as operating machinery or security monitoring.  
We hope that future work on our model can help contribute to these challenging 
problems. 
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